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Abstract 
  
The two Japanese economies, the high growth period economy and the Bubble Economy 
have common features, but they are different in many respects. Though different models for 
analysing these two economies appear here, they are basically the same. They are based on 
the Eichner-Kaleckian type models, and the model for the high growth period economy could 
be located as a special case of the Bubble Economy model. The reason for not applying the 
latter model to both periods is that not doing so makes the common features and differences 
of both periods clearer. In both economies, the predetermined or exogenous variables, bank 
loan interest rate in the high growth period and financial investment return net of risk play 
key roles. Finally, these Eichner-Kaleckian models seem to contradict Post Keynesian 
endogenous money supply. It is proven below that this is not true. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this paper is to construct Eichner-Kaleckian type models for comparison of 
Japanese corporate finance during the high growth period with that in the Bubble Economy. 
Both economies were produced, in terms of form, by similar factors – deficit spending of 
economic units – but spending patterns were quite different. In the high growth period, deficit 
spending was directed mainly towards purchasing new plant and equipment, whereas the 
Bubble Economy was largely characterised by purchasing assets. Therefore, the high growth 
period caused a production increase, while the Bubble Economy raised asset values. Both 
economies enjoyed prosperity (whether it is superficial or not), but their natures are quite 
different. 
 
This paper constructs economic models of both economies to highlight their characteristic 
features. In the high growth period, it would be better to describe the economic features by 
focusing on changes of flows, such as incremental real investment, while during the Bubble 
Economy it is considered better to focus on changes of stock variables, such as basic 
expected valuations of share price movements, levels of investment, and price changes of 
financial assets. In addition, the risk involved in investment plays a key role in the Bubble 
Economy with entrepreneurs’ subjective anticipation of the future.  
 
Even though both economies enjoyed prosperity, economic growth rates were quite different 
and therefore substitution effects whose neglect brings us no major problems in the high 
growth period are more important in the Bubble Economy, which will be reflected in the 
models below. 
 
Besides corporate finance, analyses of prices behaviour in both economies are also important. 
This is because the models below are dependent on the link between internal funds for 
investment and pricing by big enterprises, incorporating the principle of Kaleckian increasing  
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risk1 into them. Thus, the following models are called Eichner- Kaleckian type models. With 
respect to the pricing models that are, beyond the risk involved in investment, more general 
models than Eichner’s2 have been developed (Kanao 1997, pp.126-7 and pp.154-5). However, 
this issue will not be dealt with here. So the connection between pricing and corporate finance 
is implicit in the following models.3  Another thing for the models to be noted is that the 
interest rate of bank loans in the high growth period and the marginal expected financial 
return net of risk (in III:1) in the Bubble Economy play a similar role to the permanent 
interest rate4  in Eichner’s model. 
 
Section II starts with discussing the high growth period economy. Section III deals with the 
forming and collapsing process of the Bubble Economy as an interaction between real and 
monetary investment by incorporating Minsky’s idea of financial fragility into an Eichner-
Kaleckian framework. Section IV deals with finance from a macroscopic viewpoint, which 
supplements the microscopic discussions of Sections II and III, highlighting the significance 
of macro-base and endogenous money supply. Section V provides a summary and draws out 
the main conclusions. 
 
 
II. CORPORATE FINANCE IN THE HIGH GROWTH PERIOD 
 
The corporate finance in the high growth period is less complex than that in the Bubble 
Economy. An easy monetary policy, that is, restriction of interest rates for promoting bank 
loans to enterprises was also important in this period. Deficit spending by firms served for 
increasing flow variables, such as GNP. 
 
As flow variables are changes of stock variables, we can describe flow and its change by 
using the model of Section III.  However, the features of this period will be made clearer by 
the special model. Analysis of financing funds in this period constructs the foundations for 
considerations below. Therefore, discussion will be developed in detail. 
  
II:1  Internal Finance of Additional Investment Funds 
  
According to Eichner, the incremental surplus value has ‘two sources: (1) the gains from 
                                                        
1  Kalecki states: ‘There are two reasons for the increase of marginal risk with the amount invested. The first is 
the fact that the greater is the investment of an entrepreneur the more his wealth position endangered in the 
event of unsuccessful business. The second is the danger of “illiquidity”. The smaller is the own capital of an 
entrepreneur investing the amount k the greater the risk he incurs’ (1937, pp.442-43). 
2  According to Eichner’s model, the megacorporation as the price leader has to pay three real costs to obtain 
internal funds by increasing its price in relation to its costs: ‘(a) the substitution effect, that is, the loss of 
market to substitute products; (b) entry factor, that is, the probability of new firms entering the industry 
…’(Eichner 1976, p.4). These real costs can be converted into the equivalent of the interest rate referred to as 
an implicit interest rate. Price increase and internal funds obtained are determined at the point where the 
implicit interest rate is equal to the permanent interest rate (see note 4). The fear of meaningful government 
intervention as the third real cost is considered to be effective in terms of setting the upper boundary of price 
increases. Eichner’s model explains price increases, not price levels themselves. This brings up difficulties in 
explaining deflationary cases. 
3 Firms incur losses as real costs to obtain internal funds (due to price adjustments) by making prices higher in 
relation to costs. These real costs are calculated and compared to the marginal costs of external funds. 
However, prices in this context are related to price levels, not price increases as in Eichner’s model. 
4 Eichner’s megacorporation can be expected to arrange its financing in such a way that it will choose the 
minimum borrowing cost during the trade cycle. Eichner (1976, p.86) referred to this minimum cost, 
considered to be constant during a given cycle, as the permanent interest rate, as in M. Friedman’s permanent 
income. 
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technological progress, as manifest by secular decline in average variable and fixed costs,  (2) 
the growth of the firm itself, as manifest by the secular increase in engineer rated 
[production] capacity’ (Eichner 1976, p. 181). The high growth period of the Japanese 
economy from the late 1950s to the early 1970s was characterised by a period of exceedingly 
buoyant investments in plant and equipment, primarily promoted around the heavy and 
chemical industries. This period also involved the introduction of new technology from 
abroad (especially America), even though it followed the domestic reconstruction process of 
more efficient production or minor innovation. Under such circumstances entrepreneurs of 
oligopolistic firms could have somewhat certain expectations about secular incremental value 
from the two sources in the future. However, it is evident that oligopolistic firms5 have the 
power to restrict, to a certain extent, excessive price competitions whereby surplus can be 
more or less assured. It should also be noted that government protection of industry 
facilitated larger surplus by restricting excessive foreign competitors. 
 
In that period, as far as price-cost relation is concerned, these processes of rising surplus 
value are represented better by cost reduction under relatively constant prices. Such a price-
cost relation would reflect the fact that the firms attach greater importance to competitions for 
increasing sales, and prefer their increasing incomes from fixed cost reductions brought about 
by higher operation ratios to their incomes obtained by price increases. In fact, as the 
investment in plant and equipment extends, there always exists a fear of overcapacity. For the 
purpose of cancelling such overcapacity, the export drive is often carried out. On the other 
hand counter cyclical monetary and fiscal policies were also potentially useful in coping with 
the fear of overcapacity. Because they give psychologically safety feelings to the firms 
together with protecting banking and heavy industries policies, even if in reality they were 
not often carried out in that period. 
 
High economic growth accelerated the growth of this type of manufacturing firms in two 
ways; one resulted from general expansion, and the other, from a relative decline in primary 
industries, especially in agriculture. In other words high economic growth will create a bigger 
income effect for manufacturing industry. When each industry grows, the demand curve of 
each firm will shift outwards. This demand expansion, shown as big income effect, pari 
passu with production capacity and the cost reduction due to technological progress are 
highly likely to lead to a disproportionate increase of the incremental surplus in each firm 
from its own long-term perspectives. 
 
The income distribution process can be delineated as the process of how the stakeholders of 
the firms negotiate with the firms for their shares of incremental surplus, like in Eichner 
(1976 chap. 5). Let us begin with assuming that the debtors’ income share has been 
determined by the firms’ debt structures and the dividend share also passively by dividend 
policy. Then we can focus on the negotiation between labour and the firm over obtaining 
residual incremental income, as seen below. 
 
The scheduled part of labour remuneration (not including bonuses) may be considered as 
determined by (pay) relativities to which Wood (1978) attached great importance as a factor 
causing wage inflationary spiral; that is, the labour remuneration determined by the result of 
wage bargaining in the key industries, such as the steel industry, plays the crucial role in 
setting the wage norm, ‘national incremental wage pattern’ in Eichner’s usage (1976 p.159). 
Firms and labour in most other industries are most likely to reach their agreements on their 
wage incremental negotiations by adopting it as their base reference. Theorising the Japanese 
wage incremental process in this way can be achieved by adopting Wood’s theoretical 
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framework for pay relativity (1978 chap. 5), with its minor modifications. However, it is not 
discussed further, because it has been done elsewhere (Kanao 1985 chap.14 and 1997 pp.178-
96). 
 
Thus, we assume that the scheduled part of labour remuneration has been determined. A part 
of the special pay also will be determined similarly. But the rest of it will have a greater 
flexibility and variance among firms or industries than the scheduled part, reflecting the 
earnings of the firms. In fact, the Economic Planning Agency estimated the percentage 
contribution of each determinant, for the fiscal years 1966-1980, to bonuses making up a 
larger part of the special pay. Those estimates tell that about 50% was contributed by the 
percentage increase of the spring wage and the rest, by the current profit rate.6 
 
Now, focusing on the latter nature of special pay such as bonuses, we can consider that firms 
are in a position to use it as their strategy. In other words, we can find ourselves in a position 
to build ‘a theoretical hypothesis,’ concerning one of additional, internal funds. 
 
Let us begin the discussion by assuming the scheduled part of remuneration and the half of 
the special pay that depend on the spring wage have been determined. Also suppose the 
firms-rated all other costs except the other half of the special wages have been determined. 
Firstly, the firms will change their prices to equalise the marginal finance costs of internal 
funds, that is, their ‘implicit’ interest rates with marginal costs paid for other alternative 
funds, as in Eichner’s megacorp (1976 pp.86-103). However, unlike Eichner’s they would 
rather not reduce their prices compared with the cost reduction than increase their prices. A 
price increase, of course, will arise whenever costs rise. Secondly, in addition to the above, 
the firms will also choose cost changes (such as lowering the degree of increasing rate of 
bonuses) as their strategy to obtain an additional internal fund.  
 
To sum up, Japanese employees have co-operated, to some extent, towards achievements of 
the objectives of firms, including some short-term sacrifices for them, and hence firms will 
have an expectation to be able to obtain some cooperation from them in planning additional 
internal finance for investment projects. Japanese labour forces have been conscious of part 
of bonuses being tied up with the performance of their firms. They can expect in return more 
bonuses and greater job security only in a growing firm. Thus, we can consider that the 
labour force employed in the Japanese firms is not merely one of the stakeholders of the 
firms, but also one having a somewhat strong identification with the firms. The wage system 
(‘seniority order wage system’) and the employment practice (‘lifetime employment system’) 
which are widely known as part of Japanese management characteristics also have helped 
foster such sympathetic feelings. 
 
Bearing in mind the relationship between labour and management as described above, it 
would be possible to consider that employees behave on the basis of long-term rather than 
short-term benefits. And furthermore, the firm which has a past history of having rewarded 
them with long-term benefits for short-term sacrifices could more easily persuade them to 
accept their cooperation in its planning strategies, even if it might involve short-term losses. 
In that case, the greater their sacrifices, the greater the later reward will be. Now, the internal, 
additional, finance planning due to cost adjustment will be summarised below.  
 
Internal additional finance due to cost adjustment  
 
Let ∆Vt be prospective, internal additional fund obtained in time t by raising special wages 
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such as bonuses at decreasing rate. The total present value of ∆Vt is 
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where k is the number of time periods for restricting the increasing rate of special wages. 
 
In order to compare bond and borrowing costs, the total present value after one period of 
labour costs including necessary compensation for labour, L is obtained as follows 
 
)()1(/ 1 jsiLL t
s
jt
t >+∆= −
=
∑  
 
where s is the time perspective entrepreneurs expect to incur the cost. The assumption of j2 
would be rational, because the additional cost incurred are likely to arise with some time-lags 
in obtaining the additional internal fund. Therefore, implicit interest rate due to cost 
adjustment equivalent of interest rate or, more precisely, marginal financing cost is 
 
1)/( −VL  
 
where assumptions are  dL /dV > 0 and d 2L /dV 2 > 0 . 
  
 
II:2 Finance of additional funds by a new issue of shares 
  
In the high growth period, the share market was immature and the finance costs by a new 
issue of shares were considerably higher, including tax. Therefore, only a minor part of 
additional funds were financed by a new issue of shares. It should be noted that major new 
shares were issued at par and were allotted to the existing shareholders at that time. Funds 
gained in this way are risk-bearing capital and therefore can be considered a contributing 
factor to building up the strong management foundation for the firm. Managers have often 
longer-term goals than shareholders. Then, the ultimate objective of the firm is power7 that is 
obtained by pursuing the growth maximisation from longer-term standpoint, while individual 
minor shareholders’ objectives are regarded as the maximisation of the sum of dividend and 
capital gain in shorter-term. On the other hand, major corporate shareholders of a given 
corporation behave in accordance with their own objectives. So the firm should be modelled 
as a separate organisation from the shareholders themselves which pursues its own goals. 
Therefore, a dividend is an outflow cost towards the outside of the firm. However, the 
marginal finance cost of the new share issued, comparable with the marginal borrowing cost, 
is calculated, not only on the current level of the dividends ‘but also on the rate at which 
those dividends can be expected to increase over time’(Eichner 1976, p.86). Such a cost as 
that calculated above per period to the amount issued is a first approximation of the marginal 
financing cost comparable to the marginal borrowing cost. 
 
However, in cost calculation further allowances should be made, because the additional funds 
by the new share have their own merits as risk bearing-capital in terms of management 
strategies. And demerits from long-term perspectives of the firm management, if any, should 
be calculated. Therefore, the net merits as the merits minus the demerits should be included 
as addition to the marginal finance cost. 
                                                        
7 See Lavoie (1992 p.99). 
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For all reasons above share markets were used only as a limited source of funding. It is 
reasonable to suppose that the marginal cost is increasing gradually with the amount issued. 
And also it could be supposed for simplicity that this increase of the marginal cost is 
negligible. 
 
II:3 The borrowing component 
 
Since the firm has a rather narrower scope for discretionary borrowing than the other 
financing means such as an internal finance, etc., and the terms and amounts of additional 
borrowing were determined by negotiation between the bank and the firm in this period, we 
can deal with that transaction behaviour as a non-zero-sum two person co-operative game.8 
 
Let us assume that the firm proposes to the bank a certain amount of optimally mixed short-
term and long-term borrowing. This proposal can be regarded as the firm’s strategy. Then, 
suppose that the bank imposes some conditions such as the ratio of collateral to loan, the 
amount of compensatory deposit and the like. A set of these conditions can be regarded as the 
bank’s strategy. If each firm and bank has merely two pure strategies for simplicity, we will 
be able to obtain the pay-off matrix as seen above. Naturally, we can increase the number of 
their pure strategies without altering the basic conclusion. Now, aij (i=1,2;  j=1,2) in Table 1 
represents the expected profit of the firm, bij , the expected profit of the bank, and subscripts i 
and j represent the firm’s strategy and the bank’s one, respectively. The expected profit of the 
firm could be obtained by substituting the term and the amount of additional borrowing (a 
pair of strategies (i, j) into the equation system, which will be made clear later. The expected 
profit of the bank can similarly be obtained if there exists a suitable profit function of the 
bank.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
 
Let Pij be the probability which the firm and the bank give each pair of strategies (i,j) 
collaboratively, where  
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The set of all available mutual expected profits, S is outlined in Figure 1. That is,  
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INSERT FIGURE 1 
 
 
                                                        
8  It also can be found in Koike (1985, chap. 5) that the relationship between the firm and the bank is grasped as 
two person co-operative games, though his discussion is different from mine. Concerning the theory of games, 
references are made to Nash (1950, 1953) and Koyama (1980). 
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This feasible set is known as convexity and compactness. However, since the pair of 
maximum values (a*, b*) is the pair of values which one can obtain independently of the 
other, each expected profit obtained by collaboration has to be not less than it. 
 
Therefore, only the shadowed area S* in the figure is the subject to be taken into account. And 
now that S* also is a compact convex set, it turns out that a continuous, real valued function 
defined on this set inevitably assumes a maximum value. Nash’s solution results in 
maximising the objective function f (a, b) = (a - a*) (b - b*) for this set (Nash, 1950). Thus, 
with a suitable objective function given, such as strictly quasiconcave function like Nash’s, 
the terms and amounts of borrowing are determined as a unique solution of the game as seen 
in the above.  
 
II:4 A model of the high growth period 
  
Bearing the statement above in mind, the following equations can be obtained. 
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Where C is the total finance cost; x1 is the amount of additional internal funds; x2* is the 
amount of additional borrowing predetermined; x3 is the amount of additional funds shares 
newly issued; i* is the effective interest rate of additional borrowing predetermined; ρis the 
marginal risk premium for the firm;µm is the expected value of marginal efficiency of 
investment; and σm  is the coefficient of variation of marginal efficiency of investment as 
measure of uncertainty. 
 
The features of the system are as follows. First, x1 here involves the amount of additional 
internal funds obtained by both price altering and cost adjustments. And in addition, here, 
account is taken of the fact that an additional internal fund arises without incurring any real 
cost, for example, due to increasing production capacity pari passu with increasing demand. 
This is illustrated in Figure 2, 0 A.  Therefore 0 A B’ in the figure, that is, the marginal cost 
curve of internal finance, R is composed of three functions as a horizontal aggregation of 
each function. Second, we have considered the amount of additional borrowing, x2 and its 
conditions, i as predetermined by negotiation between the firm and the bank. Therefore, let 
them be x2* and i*, as the predetermined variables. Third, the point to note is the introduction 
of uncertainty and increasing risk into equation (3). It represents that ρ is the increasing 
function of the amount of additional borrowing to the additional investment funds and also 
the increasing function of σm. 
 
In the above system, assumptions are that the expected value of marginal efficiency of 
investment µm in equation (4) is the decreasing function of ∆I, and that σm in equation (5) is 
the decreasing function of µm.  It should be noted here that the position of µm depends on the 
firm’s expectations of industry growth contained only implicit in the function µm and 
marginal efficiency of investment determines the slope of µm curve as in Eichner (1976 
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chap.3 ). 
 
The working of the above system is as follows. First, substituting (1), (4) and (5) into (3) 
yields (3)’  ))]((,/[ *2 IIxg mm ∆∆= µσρ
 
Let us call (3)’ marginal risk premium function. This function could be depicted as a 
positively sloped curve in the (∆I,ρ) plane if the effect of increasing risk due to σm were not 
fully cancelled out by the effect of decreasing risk due to x2* /∆I. But ρ here is likely to be 
much smaller than that in the Bubble Economy to which will be discussed later. Second, 
substituting (4) into (2) yields (2)’   ρµ −∆= )(* Ii m
 
Let us call (2)’ marginal risk capacity function. This function could be illustrated as a 
negatively sloped curve in the (∆I ,ρ) plane. 
 
Thus, the equilibrium value (∆I )* can be obtained from (3)’ and (2)’.9  By substituting (∆I)* 
into equation (b), the determinate solutions of x
1 and x3 are obtained as the solution of 
minimisation problem of C under constraint (b). 
 
Assumptions of and are to be considered rational, because a 
finance fund by the new shares was a minor part, as stated above, in the form of a par issue 
and therefore, the upward part of the marginal financing cost curve of the fund can be 
regarded as negligible, as stated above, without undermining our model. Therefore, given a 
constant value C* to C, C* would be depicted as a curve with a concave shape towards an 
origin in the (x
0/ 3 >∂∂ xC  0/ 232 =∂∂ xC
1 , x3) plane, since we make assumptions of  
 
∂C /∂x1 > 0 and ∂2C /∂x12> 0, 10  so that a unique solution can be obtained. 
 
The system above will reverse of the selection order of financing sources, should more stable 
and longer-term funds be more favourable for the firm’s interests.11 In such a situation 
additional internal funds should be considered first before a new issue of shares, or borrowing 
as a last resort. It should be noted, however, that in this system borrowing has the first 
priority, and then additional internal funds and financing through new share issues come into 
consideration within decision making. On the other hand the firm can properly estimate, to a 
certain degree, the part of internally generated funds x
1
obtained without incurring costs. 
                                                        
9  Even if (3)’ is depicted as a negatively sloped curve in the (∆I ,ρ) plane, insofar as the absolute value of slope 
in (3)’ is less than that in (2)’ and ρ in (3)’ is positive within a relevant value of ∆I (which are considered 
reasonable assumptions), there exists a stable equilibrium. This is because the case where (2)’ is located lower 
than (3)’ in every respect, which corresponds to Minsky (1975, p.127, Diagram 6.4) as depicted in the case of 
great depression, is eliminated. There are also sufficient reasons to believe that the influence of x
•
* /∆I  to ρ is 
small. The reason is that the big firm and bank are closely combined through managerial resources and in 
addition, as Nakatani (1987, pp.91-106) states, they provide a kind of mutual insurance system with each 
other. Therefore, normally the shapes of both curves (2)’ and (3)’ will be just like (5a) and (2a) in figure3, 
respectively. 
 
10 .  From the assumptions of ∂C/∂x3 > 0 and   
∂
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2C /∂x32 = 0, we can put .  And ∂2C/∂x3 • ∂x1 = ∂2C /∂x1 • ∂x3 = 0.  Therefore,     
 
  
11  Abe and Sasaki (1984 pp. 60-61) state as follows: the principle of finance sources for plant and equipment 
investment is that internal funds should be considered as the first order, the funds by share newly issued, as 
the second , and the long-term borrowing, as the third. 
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Therefore, the internally generated funds determined by the system above is only the residual 
part of x1. Besides, x3 also is a minor part of financing funds, as stated above. Thus, 
considering the fact that a larger part of investment fund consisted of the borrowing fund, and 
that the firm could not set up its investment project without planning the borrowing, we could 
conclude that the above system where the borrowing is predetermined, reflects the situation 
of corporate finance in this period, and hence can be regarded as reasonable. However, it 
should be added that the amount of internally generated funds was small relatively to the 
amount of investment, yet not as small in absolute terms.12 
 
Thus, Figure 2 can be obtained. 0AB’ is the marginal finance cost of additional internal funds 
as described above, B’B” that of additional borrowing, and C’D’ the marginal finance cost of 
new shares issued. This figure illustrates that a larger part of additional investment funds is 
additional borrowing, BC, and that the internally generated additional funds, 0B and the 
financing funds of the new shares issued, CD are both minor.13   In the figure, it should be 
noted that each marginal finance cost has its origin in 0, B, and C. Although the graphic 
expression is unorthodox, it clarifies the relative amount and marginal finance cost of each 
financing source. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
 
Three important points can be derived from the above analysis. The first and the second are 
concerned with interpretations of the factors that brought about high growth in terms of 
corporate finance, and the third discusses the stability of capitalist economies. 
 
Firstly, policies, such as low interest policies which encouraged loans to firms from banks, 
and the protection of banking and heavy industry which decreased lenders’ risk, has often 
been discussed to date. However, it is very rare that these policies have been discussed in 
terms of pushing outwards borrowers’ increasing risk together with the close relationships of 
firms with banks as shown above. The analysis emphasises this point with buoyant 
investment activities as the fundamental condition. Without mitigating borrowers’ increasing 
risk the firm could not carry out such a large amount of borrowing. On the one hand the low 
interest policy makes the marginal capacity curve (which can be depicted by (2)’) shift 
upwards by lowering financing cost. On the other hand the protected industry policy makes 
the marginal risk premium curve (which can be depicted by (3)’) flat and shift downwards by 
pushing outwards increasing risk. These two points contributed to high growth.   
 
Secondly, the oligopolistic firms’ power to restrict excessive price competition combined 
with the protected industry policies made possible to capture absolutely large internal funds, 
though relatively small to the amount of investment.14  Because the protected industry 
policies made lower real costs that the firms incur to capture internal funds through 
increasing prices in relation to costs (for meaning of real costs see note 1). In addition the 
firms could tap another internal financing source by cost adjustments as stated above. 
 
Thirdly, capitalist economies, especially such as the Japanese economy appear stable in the 
high growth period. However, such a phenomenon is only hidden by buoyant investment 
                                                        
12 See Suzuki (1974 chap. 2). 
13 The problem is which constraint comes first, rising marginal costs of new shares issued or the narrowness of 
share markets. In the figure the firm faces the former constraint. The vertical dotted line above i* shows the 
limitation of new shares issued, that is, the narrowness of share markets. 
14 With these policies, this result of the analysis may be similar to the orthodox view, though the method is 
different. 
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activities. Both the marginal capacity curve and the marginal risk premium curve are 
intrinsically unstable, because they depend on firms’ subjective expectations and have a self-
fulfilling nature. Once the role of external markets (export and government deficit)15 begins 
to increase, instability of the economy surfaces. Such an economy cannot be sustained long 
without friction. Friction will give negative influences both curves. These negative influences 
will further most likely be reinforced by the self-augmentational nature of both curves. This 
self-augment can be seen in the form of an extreme case as in III. 
 
  
III. A PROCESS OF FORMATION AND COLLAPSE OF THE BUBBLE 
ECONOMY 
  
In the Japanese low or medium growth period from 1974 to 1989, the ratio of the asset value 
such as land and shares to GDP has continuously increased and especially drastically 
increased during the Bubble. Therefore, variations of asset values tend to influence the 
Japanese real economy, and emerge remarkably during the Bubble. 
 
Generally speaking, the Bubble Economy was caused by misguided policy of expansionary 
domestic demand combined with financial innovation. These exogenous factors are 
important, but the Bubble would not have been generated without the speculative 
augmentation mechanism as endogenous factors inherent in the Japanese economy. The 
speculation process in mid-1980s to early 90s, the so-called Bubble was driven as real-
monetary interaction by speculative behaviour of each economic unit, creating fragility in 
each financial position and the economy as a whole. Therefore, Minsky’s idea is incorporated 
into the model below in observing that process, and focusing on the behaviour of firms as the 
big enterprises. 
 
Finally, the bud of speculation called the Bubble is intrinsic not only in the Japanese 
economy but also in other capitalist economies. 
 
III:1 A model of corporation finance 
 
Bearing this in mind and considering the economic features described in section I, the 
following equation system can be obtained. 
 
      (1) I +β = X1 + X2 + X3 
      (2) ρ = g [ω(X2/I), σm ] 
      (3) µm = µm ( I , R ) 
      (4) σm = σm (µm ) 
      (5) i = µm - ρ 
      (6) R = R(X1)                  
      (7) i = i(X2) 
      (8) iw = iw(X3) 
      (9)  i*= i                                       
     (10) i* = R                 
     (11) i*= iw  
                                                       
  
In the above, I, β and ω are amount of real investment, amount of financial investment, and 
basic valuation ratio of debt to assets, respectively. i* represents the marginal expected return 
 
15 See also Kalecki (1954 p.52). 
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of financial investment net of risk, and is treated as a constant variable for simplicity, even 
though it is determined by the entrepreneurs’ prospect for market conditions. However, more 
complex cases in which the financial investment is supposed as an endogenous variable have 
been dealt with (Kanao 1997, pp.166-67 ). The treatment of this simplified assumption makes 
the discussion clearer. X1 is similar to x1 in section II, except that X1 is internal funds for I 
and β, but X2 and X3 are different, reflecting different economic situations. X2 is the amount 
of borrowing from outside, but it includes not only bank loans but also finance by issuing 
bonds, which reflects a drifting away from corporate reliance on bank funding to the 
development of bond markets. X3 is the fund captured by new shares issued at market prices. 
They are low finance costs for the firm in comparison with the par issues in the high growth 
period. 
 
Even though others are similar as in section II, some functions still require explanation. First, 
ω reflects entrepreneurs’ expectations concerning valuations of stock variables like assets and 
debt, and tends to expose itself to speculative unstable changes. It is also considered as an 
increasing function of X2 /I, that is, dω/d (X2/ I ) > 0.  Then dρ/dω >0. Second, µm is not only 
the decreasing function of I but also that of R. This means that the firm is not likely to neglect 
deterioration of the expected value of investment influenced by real cost due to the 
substitution effect as in Eichner (see note 1), because during the Bubble, the growth rate was 
lower than in the high growth period and the income effect was smaller. Lower growth will 
make buyers more sensitive. In addition competitions with imports has become more severe. 
Therefore, the substitution effect could not be neglected. Third, the role of marginal risk 
premiumρinvolved in investment is becoming more important, because in the high growth 
period, entrepreneurs could roughly have correct anticipation of the future growth rate from a 
long-term point of view, and consequently ρ was smaller. In fact, as shown below, ρ plays a 
vital role in the speculative behaviour of big enterprises. Finally, one of the most important 
things is that during the Bubble Economy, a large part of X2 and X3 were financed through 
markets differently from those in the high growth period, and therefore, agency problems 
involved in financing by X2 and X3 become more important. However, agency costs are 
implicit in the model above, because these costs are reflected in shifts of (7) i = i(X2) and (8) 
iw = iw(X3).  
 
Now is the time to investigate the workings of the model. By substituting i* into (6) - (11), we 
can obtain the determined values of X1, X2, X3, and R.  Put in these values as X1
0
, X2
0
, X3
0
, and 
i* respectively. Substituting X2
0
 and i* into (2) and (3) together with (4) yields the following 
equation. 
 
   (2a) ρ = g [ω(X20 / I)), σm {µm (I,i*)}] 
  
From equations (3), (5), (9), and (10), the equation is obtained as follows. 
 
   (5a) ρ = µm (I,i*) – i* 
  
(2a) and (5a) are also called, respectively, the marginal premium function and the marginal 
capacity function, as in (3)’ and (2)’ of II:4. (2a) and (5a) together with (1) yield Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 shows that the amount of real investments is I0 and that of financial investments is 
β0 .Two points should be noted before proceeding. First, X20 / I in the equation (2a) can be 
resolved into the following components in relation to financial investment. That is, X2
0
 / I = 
[X2
0
 /(X1 + X2 +X3 )] • [(X1 +X2+X3 ) / I] = α(1 +β/I). 
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INSERT FIGURE 3 
 
This represents that the ratio of debt to real investment, X2
0
 / I increases as either the ratio of 
debt to financing funds, X2
0
 / (X1 + X2 +X3) as α or the ratio of financial investment to real 
investment, β rises. Therefore, ceteris paribus, the relative increase of β is to rise ρ through 
the rise of X2
0
/ I. The second is concerned with the pervasive roles of gross profits. Gross 
profits are valuable sources providing the firm with ‘the cash flows that validate past 
financial commitments. [Gross] Profits are also the signals for investments and current 
financial commitments’ (Minsky 1978, p.2; [ ] added). Therefore, it is assumed in the above 
model that the way they have validated past financial commitments gives σm influences, and 
then σm influences ∆. Also gross profits as ‘the signals for investments and current financial 
commitments’ give influences to ω through X2 / I and then, to ∆. 
 
III:2 The process of the formation of the Bubble Economy 
  
From mid-80s to 89 the deficit spending (expenditures in excess of incomes) in the Japanese 
economy brought about enormous price hikes of assets like land and shares. The 1994 
Economic Survey of Japan (Japanese Economic Agency ed.) elucidated that the capital gains 
from price increases in shares and land, especially in 1986, 1987, and 1989, were more than 
the nominal GDP in the respective fiscal years (pp.196-97). At the same time the money 
supply was increasing at more than the proportionate rate to the nominal GDP, and it was 
shown that the asset values were rising pari passu with the debt values (1993 Economic 
Survey of Japan, chap.2). According to Okumura (1992), the large corporations financed 1.74 
times their funds for the acquisitions of land and the investments of plant and equipment in 
1985, 1.14 times in 1986, 1.59 times in 1987, and 1.92 times in 1988. Considering that 
acquisitions of land included the funds for speculative purposes and the investment amount of 
plant and equipment was less than the sum of accumulated profits and depreciation 
allowance, no small part of their funds must have been spent towards speculative purposes. 
 
The role in which the finances of the big corporations played in driving the speculative 
Bubble is as follows. The funds financed by deficit spending sustained by the credit 
relaxation measures raised the value of shares and land by being directed towards these 
assets. On one hand, this improves revenue from financial investment connected with share 
prices, such as specified money trusts and fund trusts, and also makes ω and σm lower which 
induce an outward shift of ρ in equation (2a). The costs of finance, especially those X2 and 
X3 are most likely lower. As the former, the price rises of assets as shares and land make 
lenders’ risk smaller and so real marginal cost of borrowing (X2) lower. It is clear from the 
definition of the costs of X3 in II:2 that the latter costs should become lower due to share 
price rises. The shift of ρ gives incentives to increasing investment, which is to shift :m 
outward in equations (5a) and (2a), and in turn this causes the shifts of  (5a) and (2a) to (5a)’ 
and (2a)’ resulting in higher investment level from I0 to I0’ in Figure 4. On the other hand, 
since I0 +β0 = X10 + X20 + X30 is determined by equations of (1), (6)- (11), (2a) and (5a), the 
lower finance costs enable X10, X20 and X30 to increase, and then this finances the funds for 
the increasing real and financial investments. The equity financing by convertible bonds,  
warranted bonds, and shares as involved in X20 and X30 increases rapidly, which is reflected in 
the shift from X10 + X20 + X30  to ( X10 + X20 + X30)’ in Figure 4. 
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INSERT FIGURE 4 
 
Table 2 shows that in composition ratios, the finances of manufacturing big firms by shares, 
warranted bonds, convertible bonds (called equity financing and largely reflected in bonds, 
shares etc.), and internal funds (depreciation and retained earnings) increased conspicuously 
but on the contrary borrowings decreased to a negative value, in the 1986-90 fiscal year 
average.16 Among these sources of funds, the finances by shares, warranted bonds, and 
convertible bonds involving issue of shares are conspicuous. 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
Sustained by the easy money policy, the big corporations continue to increase their deficit 
expenditures. The prices of assets rise more sharply, which increases collateral values and 
then enables them to borrow even more easily. The asset price hikes play another role in 
promoting speculative behaviour. The price hikes make ρ smaller because the big 
corporations could easily cover their business loss by disposing of their increasingly valuable 
assets even if they failed in gaining profits. Thus the above speculative process continues to 
repeat itself with incremental real and financial investments. 
 
The formation process of the Bubble Economy can be described as stated above. It should be 
noted that the Bubble created financial fragility within itself. Therefore, even slight adverse 
changes of financial conditions cause financial difficulties where annual cash flows could not 
cover debt payments, or bankruptcy. 
 
III:3 The process of the collapse of the Bubble Economy 
 
Minsky states: ‘A regime of low short-and long-term interest rates will lead to a large margin 
between the two prices [demand price for capital assets and supply price of investment], 
which leads to a high ratio of external to internal finance’(Minsky 1986, p.195, [ ] added). 
This is a similar situation to the Japanese economy from 1986 to 1989, though the long-term 
interest rate was much higher than the short-term interest rate. Therefor, there were ‘profit 
prospects that induce unites to engage in speculative finance.17…one can make on the carry 
by financing positions in capital assets by long- and short-term debts, and positions in long-
term financial assets by short-term, presumably liquid, debts’(ibid. p.211). However, the 
equity finance costs were lower, compared with even short-term interest rate. Therefore, the 
major role of speculative finance could be considered to be played by the equity finances, 
such as new shares issued, convertible bonds, and warranted bonds. It should be noted that 
this is the case especially in the big enterprises of manufacturing industries, and also that the 
borrowing ratio is higher in the small enterprises. 
 
The low costs of equity finances were sustained by the credit relaxation measures and the 
price increases of land and shares as a result of them. As previously noted, the Bubble created 
financial fragility within itself. Therefore, even slight adverse changes of financial conditions 
lead the firms to financial difficulties where annual cash flows could not cover debt 
payments, or bankruptcy. In fact, after the Bank of Japan increased the bank rate several 
times, share prices dropped sharply and then the land prices began to fall down. This is called 
the collapse of the ‘Myth of Land,’ because except temporary exceptional cases the land 
                                                        
16 This contrasts the situation in the small firms of the manufacturing industry and non-manufacturing firms. In   
these firms, borrowing ratios increase. 
17 For the definition of speculative finance, see Minsky (1978, p.15). 
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prices have experienced continuous post war rises. As the result of an asset price fall, there 
were drastic and widespread bankruptcies characterised as ‘big’ not only in number but also 
in liabilities. 
 
In terms of modelling, generally speaking, the bursting of the bubble is the converse case of 
its expansion. However, the contraction speed is in a sharp contrast with that of the swelling 
of the Bubble, which is reflected in changes of ω. ω as the basic expectations of debt to asset 
value ratios is likely to decrease gradually in the expansion period of speculation, because 
debt values also increase even if less than asset values do. Yet it is very likely to increase 
rapidly in the contraction period of speculations for two reasons. First, as convertible bonds 
would not be largely converted into shares, asset values are expected to be smaller and debt 
values, larger. Second, a drastic fall of share price results in the sharp reduction of asset 
values. These two effects make the numerator of ω larger and the denominator of it smaller. 
In addition, σm as the measure of uncertainty is most likely to be larger because of increasing 
uncertainty. Thus, (2a) shifts upwards greatly and real investment begins to fall. This is also 
likely to cause (5a) downward shift, as µm shifts downwards due to shrinkage of real 
investment. These processes are depicted as in Figure 5. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 5 
 
The drastic decrease in asset prices makes lenders’ risk increase rapidly, which is connected 
with the increasing marginal finance costs by borrowing and bonds reflected in the costs of 
X2, or the restriction of the amounts of borrowing from shortage of sufficient collateral to 
cover the risk. The financing costs of X3 also increase and the volume of X3 will shrink. 
Therefore, X1 + X2 + X3 becomes smaller with relative increase of X1, not in absolute terms. 
This process can be depicted as the shift of (1) – 
 
from I0 + β0= X10 + X20 + X30     
to I0*+β0* = X10
 
*+ X20* + X30* in figure 5.   
 
In fact, the composition ratio of the sum of depreciation and retained earnings as internal 
funds is conspicuously high in the 1991-92 fiscal year average, as seen in table 2, compared 
to ratios of other financing funds. With respect to β0  as financial investment, it decreases to a 
large extent since the expansion of fund trusts and specified money trusts is based on share 
price hikes. 
  
 
IV. MACROSCOPIC VIEW OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT 
  
As internal additional funds are obtained by buoyant revenues, raising prices or adjusting 
costs, it seems as though the funds necessary for investment were gained entirely from 
outside. What was stated above proves to be true from an individual entrepreneur. However, 
investment basically finances itself as a whole. It could be called a kind of fallacy of 
composition like in Kaleckian capitalist profits. The statement below is concerned with the 
way investment finances itself and savings created by investment compose sources of funds. 
Suppose that investment rises by 100. Investment increases prior to (planned) savings and is 
financed by bank loans. These loans make up business deposits18 of the enterprises that 
received the credit necessary for meeting production on investment orders. The enterprises 
must pay not only incomes, as wages and profits, but also material costs by these business 
                                                        
18  For the meaning of terms, income deposits, business deposits, and savings deposits, see Keynes (1971, pp.30-
32). Income deposits and savings deposits in this paper are used as covering all income and savings. 
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deposits. Thus, the business deposits circulate from business deposits to business deposits, 
creating income deposits.19  These reiterative processes create the income deposits in total 
equal to the investment increase in investment industries. Let, say, 60% of the income be 
consumed. (The average and marginal propensity to consume is 0.6.) Savings deposits20 
created are 40. A consumption increase of 60 creates equal income deposits through 
circulation of business deposits as is stated above. Of 60 income deposits, 24 become savings 
deposits. 
 
By these reiterative processes, saving deposits in total is finally equal to investment increase. 
For simplicity, the statement in this paragraph depends on the assumption that the increases 
of imports and taxes are neglected. Now, we are able to describe the compositions of 
corporate finance from a macroscopic point of view. The enterprises that produced 
investment goods on initial orders receive 40 as a part of payments from the investment 
sector including themselves and 60 as the other part from the consumption sector by selling 
their investment goods, if investment goods are utilised in direct ratio to sales across the 
economy. The firms of the investment sector and consumer sector finance their funds through 
internal funds as savings deposits of firms, bank loans (especially long-term loans), and 
issuing bonds and shares. The sources of their funds come from savings deposits of firms and 
households. The deposits of the latter are directed towards bank deposits, and purchasing 
bonds and shares. Excessive bank deposits (as the part of households’ savings) over 
purchasing bonds and shares are appropriated for the loans (especially long-term loans) to the 
firms and the banks' holding of bonds and shares based on the banks’ profitability. Thus the 
initial short-term borrowing of the firms can be paid back, as in the Asimakopulos’s case 
(1983). 
 
He argued as follows: the conditions that validate the smooth independence of investment 
increase from a prior saving increase are the willingness of banks to accept a deteriorating 
liquidity position and the smooth funding from short term liability to long term liability 
(Asimakopulos 1983).21 
 
These two conditions were fulfilled during the high growth period and the Bubble Economy 
in Japan, that is, by the Bank of Japan’s overloans and by asset price hikes through the easy 
monetary policy respectively. However, prosperity makes provision for the bud of depression 
within itself as is often stated. In this respect, the importance of financial provision should be 
pointed out. Financial provision has been accumulated even during the Bubble.22  As Keynes 
said, the increase of financial provision means that ‘we are aggravating the difficulty of 
securing equilibrium tomorrow’ (1973, p.105). However, the problems of financial provision 
have been hidden in the high growth period and the Bubble Economy. After both periods, 
overinvestments manifested themselves, especially, conspicuously after the Bubble 
Economy. From macroscopic corporate finance, Table 3 confirms this fact. We can easily see 
that the finance ratio of depreciation and internal earnings in total is overwhelmingly big and 
considerably covers the capital investment fund, especially after the Bubble Economy.   
                                                        
19  For the meaning of terms, income deposits, business deposits, and savings deposits, see Keynes (1971, pp.30-
32). Income deposits and savings deposits in this paper are used as covering all income and savings.  
20  For the meaning of terms, income deposits, business deposits, and savings deposits, see Keynes (1971, pp.30-
32). Income deposits and savings deposits in this paper are used as covering all income and savings. 
21 There exist some controversies and Asimakopulos’s replies around Asimakopulos (1983). For these, see 
Snippe (1985), Asimakopulos (1985), Terzi (1986), Asimakopulos (1986a), Richardson (1986), 
Asimakopulos (1986b), Snippe (1986). 
22  Hara (1999 pp.150-59) discusses the importance of Keynes’s financial provision in ‘mechanism of capital 
accumulation in Japan’. 
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INSERT TABLE 3 
 
 
V CONCLUSION 
  
As seen above, the models here are quite different from both the orthodox corporate finance 
models, as in the MM (theorem) models,23 and the agency models. The models in this paper 
are based on fundamentally different assumptions from these two types of theories, because 
the firms are supposed to be organisations pursuing their own goals, separated from 
shareholders themselves as mentioned in II:2.  In addition, it is clear that the division of 
stakeholders of the firms into agencies and principals is inappropriate, as far as the Japanese 
firms are concerned, because the management of the Japanese firms do not have only loyalty 
to the firms but also have a long-term perspective of the situation. Therefore, relations 
between firms and their management are better described by grasping the management, rather 
as the agency of the firms than as the agency of the shareholders. The shareholders are only 
one of stakeholders of the firms. 
 
Bearing the above in mind, we can proceed to make a summarised comparison between the 
models of the high growth period and the Bubble Economy.  
 
Corporate finance in the high growth period is represented as a simple framework, because 
the most important finance is bank borrowing, and the residuals are internal funds and new 
shares issued as minor parts. Therefore, the model in the high growth period is a special case 
of the model during the Bubble Economy. However, using two different models serves to 
highlight characteristics of each as seen above. The two economies, the high growth economy 
and the Bubble Economy were created by the common factor, deficit spending that was 
triggered and /or sustained by the common policies, that is easy monetary policies. However, 
both economies have contrasts in many respects: non-market vs. market, flow vs. stock, real 
side vs. financial side, and income effect vs. substitution effect.24  Therefore, during the 
Bubble Economy, agency costs which the market charges on financing external funds are 
more important, stocks such as land and shares play more essential roles, and the substitution 
effect in Eichner’s meaning (see note 2) becomes more important through international 
market competition, as is reflected in the equation (3) of III:1. 
 
In addition, this paper contributes to the analysis of the Japanese economy by developing the 
risk capacity function and the risk premium function ((2)’ and (3)’ in II:4, (5a) and (2a) in 
                                                        
23  See Modigliani, F. and Miller, M. (1958) and Modigliani, F. and Miller, M.(1963). 
24  In high growth period the bank borrowing as the major financing source can be regarded as determined by 
personal negotiations between the firm and the bank. Share market was immature as shown above. On the 
other hand, various financing sources through markets such as equity finances (shares, warranted bonds, 
convertible bonds) and straight bonds etc. have been developed until the Bubble. Borrowing composition 
ratio decreased drastically in 1986-90, and is negative value, -1.0 as seen in table 2. In addition these equity 
finances played one of key roles in the Bubble economy. Therefore, the point-blank expression of the 
corporate finances between both periods could be called non-market vs. market. For explanation of income 
effect vs. substitution effect see II:2 and III:1. For the meaning of flow vs. stock see the entry of III.  For 
the increasing importance of financial side, after showing that the ratio of the amounts of exchange 
transaction to current transaction in the world was very high even in 1986 and rapidly increasing from 1986 
to 1989, Miyazaki (1992) states: ‘since 1970s the financial economy has been becoming the leading factor of 
the world economy [including Japan] by replacement of the real economy’(p.13, [  ] added). The analysis of 
III, as shown above, cannot be done without considering the real-monetary interactions. 
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III:1). Important policy implications appear from the analysis by both functions and the 
above statements. Our capitalist economies are not so stable as the orthodox equilibrium 
theorists suppose them to be, as stated in section III. Even in high growth period, instability 
of the economy was only hidden, as stated in II:4, by buoyant investment activities.   
 
New waves of financial revolution and deregulation are under way in Japan and also 
internationally. On the one hand, both are certainly useful in terms of resource allocations 
world-wide. On the other hand, they tend to increase instability factors, especially by 
speculation, because both functions are intrinsically unstable and instability factors from 
abroad can have a deleterious impact on the domestic stability of both functions through 
increasingly close interactions of the world economy. This suggests us further necessities for 
the establishment of controlling and stabilising systems in the world economy through further 
international cooperation, even although we have already had domestic Keynesian monetary 
and fiscal stabilisation policies. 
 
Furthermore, Japan has not developed sufficiently adaptive financial institutions to the 
changing economic circumstances. The banking system still retains the legacy of the high 
growth period, even during the Bubble Economy. Share markets should have been developed 
to promote individual share holdings. Prevailing cross shareholdings among firms has 
discouraged individual share holdings and has made fewer shares appear in the market. It is 
also considered that this was one of the contributing factors to accelerating the Bubble, by 
making manipulation of share prices easier. 
 
The saving structure implicit in the discussion of financial provision in section IV, suggests 
that they are still in the adaptive situation for the high growth economy. Savings are 
excessive simply in terms of conversion of investment funding from short-term liability to 
long term liability. In other words, savings are appropriated for purchasing bonds and shares 
newly issued, and borrowing long-term loan, which are used for purchasing investment 
goods. This makes the timely repayment of short-term bank loan possible, as shown in 
section IV. Investment and Kalecki’s external markets (government deficit spending and 
excess export) creates savings, and not vice versa. Thus, in contrast to the orthodox view 
Japan’s current surplus is continuously contributing to the world economy as a stagnant 
factor, as suggested by Halevi and Kriesler (1996), in an ever increasingly interdependent 
world economy. Accumulating never-utilised foreign exchange also means welfare loss for 
present generations in Japan. Now is the time when Japan should consider more seriously 
reducing over precautionary savings by individuals through changing the content of public 
expenditures. 
 
Finally this article is rare type of analysis of Japanese corporate finance, in terms of 
integration of corporate finance and pricing (which is discussed here only implicitly). At 
present corporate finance theory still separates finance theory from pricing theory. The 
current discussion, however, holds that a more integrated analysis of these two will lead to a 
deeper theoretical understanding of both fields. 
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